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Anton Pannekoek’s Epistemic 
Virtues in Astronomy and Socialism
Personae and the Practice of Science
chaokang tai and jeroen van dongen
Anton Pannekoek (1873-1960) was both an innovative astronomer and an influential 
Marxist. In this article we will investigate both his Milky Way research and Marxist 
philosophy, with special focus on his ideal scholarly persona and the epistemic 
virtues he advocated in his research. This focus allows us to place Pannekoek in 
the larger development of scientific methodology during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century and, most importantly, offers insight into how Pannekoek’s 
scientific and socialist research were related.
Anton Pannekoek en zijn epistemische deugden in astronomie en socialisme. Personae in de 
praktijk
Anton Pannekoek (1873-1960) was zowel innovatief astronoom als invloedrijk 
marxist. Dit artikel bespreekt zijn onderzoek naar de structuur van de Melkweg 
en zijn marxistische filosofie, waarbij we in het bijzonder onze aandacht richten op 
Pannekoeks epistemische deugden en de daarmee geassocieerde ideale persona. 
Dit perspectief stelt ons in staat om Pannekoek in de bredere ontwikkeling van de 
wetenschappelijke methodologie in de negentiende en vroege twintigste eeuw 
te plaatsen. Voorts biedt het ons inzicht in hoe Pannekoeks sterrenkundige en 
socialistische onderzoek gerelateerd waren.
Introduction
In recent years much research has been conducted on the scholarly 
or scientific ‘persona’. This research expressed different but related 
ideas of what the concept of a persona actually is and how it can aid in 
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
1 Herman Paul, ‘What is a Scholarly Persona?: 
Ten Theses on Virtues, Skills, and Desires’, 
History and Theory 53:3 (2014) 348-371 doi 10.1111/
hith.10717.
2 As e.g. in the case of absentmindedness and 
emotional detachment; see Gadi Algazi, ‘Scholars 
in Households: Refiguring the Learned Habitus, 
1480-1550’, Science in Context 16:1-2 (2003) 9-42 
doi 10.1017/s0269889703000681.
3 For example, radar and nuclear physicist Merle 
Tuve ascribed moral and aesthetic virtues to a 
proper scientific identity that contrasted greatly 
with the realities of science during the cold war: 
Jessica Wang, ‘Physics, Emotion, and the Scientific 
Self: Merle Tuve’s Cold War’, Historical Studies in 
the Natural Sciences 42 (2012) 341-388 doi 10.1525/
hsns.2012.42.5.341. 
4 Paul, ‘What is a Scholarly Persona?’.
5 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity 
(New York 2007).
6 Daston and Galison even express that their 
approach may be considered ‘superficial’ as they 
do not dig too deep into individual cases: Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison, ‘Response: Objectivity 
and Its Critics’, Victorian Studies 50 (2008) 666-677 
doi 10.2979/vic.2008.50.4.666. 
understanding scholarship historically. On the one hand, personae have 
been interpreted as exemplars of what a scientist ought to be and how he 
should produce his work.1 On the other hand, personae have been construed 
as public masks, for instance as identities that could bolster the public image 
of scholars and justify characteristics that might otherwise be perceived as 
flaws.2 In both cases there is an obvious tension between the idealisations 
captured and the realities scientists faced: personae are particularly intended 
to help in giving direction to, and justification of scholars’ activities.3 
As such, they provide a moral imperative: they are closely linked to the 
circulation of epistemic virtues, as these too, express moral guidelines that 
should be internalised when aiming to gain knowledge.4 The scholarly 
persona acts as an embodiment of these virtues. At the same time these 
virtues can be seen as technologies of the self that serve to mould the self in 
the direction of becoming a model scholar. Historians of science Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison for example, have shown how nineteenth century 
strivings for the most ‘objective’ or mechanically produced scientific 
representations of the world went hand in hand with a conception of the 
ideal scientist as someone who suppresses his intuitions to such an extent 
that he may best be compared with a recording machine.5
Daston and Galison’s account is unapologetically ‘mesoscopic’ as it 
tracks the longue durée dynamics of epistemic virtues, their associated personae 
and their larger cultural and scientific reverberations.6 However, as we 
will argue here, as a historiographical tool the persona and the associated 
epistemic virtues it reflects are also quite useful in studying individual cases: 
they allow us to bridge the gap between the microscopic and the mesoscopic, 
as they aid in understanding how the mesoscopic influences the way 
particular knowledge is produced by an individual scholar. Furthermore, a 
focus on personae enables us to look beyond the constraints of disciplinary 
boundaries in scholarship, and thus contributes to a ‘post-disciplinary’ 
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7 On how virtues and personae were shared 
across disciplines, see e.g. Herman Paul, ‘The 
Scholarly Self: Ideals of Intellectual Virtue 
in Nineteenth-Century Leiden’, in: Thijs 
Weststeijn, Jaap Maat and Rens Bod (eds.), The 
Making of the Humanities. Vol. 2: From Early 
Modern to Modern Disciplines (Amsterdam 2012) 
397-411.
8 For example, the ideal scientist according to 
prominent astronomer Arthur Eddington 
was largely shaped by early twentieth century 
Quaker values such as pacifism, ‘seeking’, and 
internationalism. See Matthew Stanley, Practical 
Mystic: Religion, Science, and A.S. Eddington 
(Chicago 2007).
9 See H. Schurer, ‘Anton Pannekoek and the 
Origins of Leninism’, Slavonic and East European 
Review 41 (1963) 327-344; Serge Bricianer, 
Pannekoek and the Workers Councils (St. Louis 
1978); Marinus Antonius M. Boekelman, The 
Development of the Social and Political Thought 
of Anton Pannekoek, 1873-1960: From Social 
Democracy to Council Communism (PhD Thesis; 
University of Toronto 1980); John Gerber, 
Anton Pannekoek and the Socialism of Workers’ 
Self-Emancipation, 1873-1960 (Dordrecht 1989); 
Hans-Manfred Bock, ‘Die Marx-Dietzgen-
Synthese Anton Pannekoeks und seines Kreises’, 
in: Marcel van der Linden and Bert Altena 
(eds.), Die Rezeption der Marxschen Theorie in den 
Niederlanden (Trier 1992).
approach to the historiography of knowledge.7 Obviously, epistemic virtues 
and idealised personae are also related to a scholar’s larger moral and personal 
convictions.8 
In this paper, we will attempt to attain a unified understanding of the 
epistemic positions of the Dutch astronomer and Marxist Anton Pannekoek 
(1873-1960). We will try to see how the microscopic and mesoscopic level 
might interact, and how personae and virtues can aid in attaining a post-
disciplinary understanding of scholarship. Pannekoek was professor 
of astronomy at the University of Amsterdam and an internationally 
prominent theorist of Marxism. His prominence in two widely differing 
fields makes him an ideal subject for studying how research across such 
disciplines can still be related in complex ways. Unfortunately, historians 
studying Pannekoek so far have made little attempt to integrate his two 
professional lives. They have focused almost exclusively on Pannekoek’s 
career in political philosophy, which has been treated without consideration 
of his scientific work.9 Thereby they followed the strict separation between 
the two spheres of his scholarship that he himself always emphasised. The 
separate personae that Pannekoek implicitly imagined for Marxist study 
and for science however, will show that these domains were actually closely 
related. In particular, the links between Pannekoek’s epistemic virtues and 
his philosophy of mind will illuminate the relation between his practice 
and methodology in Marxism and astronomy. Thus we will see how a focus 
on epistemic virtues and the personae that represent them could assist in 
understanding the full relation between different disciplinary spheres 
of scholarship. Obviously, in the case of Pannekoek this also deepens our 
understanding of his intellectual biography.
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity

Anton Pannekoek sitting behind his desk (1919).
Anton Pannekoek Institute for Astronomy, 
 University of Amsterdam.
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10 Jeroen van Dongen, Einstein’s Unification 
(Cambridge 2010).
11 See e.g. Albert Einstein, ‘Autobiographisches’, 
in: P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-
Scientist (La Salle il 1949) 1-94. 
Pannekoek never explicitly formulated an ideal scientific persona or 
ideal Marxist scholar. Nevertheless their contours are revealed when looking 
at the motivations he put forward for his practice of science: by considering 
how Pannekoek reacted to the work of other astronomers and other 
Marxists, and how he suggested correcting their perceived flaws, we obtain 
an understanding of how he envisioned his ideal astronomer and his ideal 
Marxist. We can then compare these two ideals and see how they relate to one 
another. Crucially, this connection between practice and persona flows in both 
directions. As in the case of the ‘objective’ scientist, the virtues of the ideal 
persona are reflected in the methodologies of the research that is conducted 
and in the sort of scientific answers that are considered acceptable. It is this 
interaction between practice and persona that we want to bring forward 
here. We are not primarily interested in how virtues are transferred from one 
scholar to the other; foremost we are interested in how these virtues and ideal 
personae actually shape science, how they play a role in the type of questions 
that are asked and the sort of answers that are acceptable across disciplinary 
divides. 
To illustrate this point we briefly consider the example of Albert 
Einstein, who himself obviously functioned as exemplar. Aware of this, he 
actively reshaped his own history in an attempt to redirect his discipline, 
theoretical physics, in opposition to the convictions of the majority of his 
colleagues. Crucially, his recollection of his path to the general theory of 
relativity, the most important of his achievements, was altered in order to 
reflect less the way the theory was actually developed, but rather the way 
that the older Einstein believed theoretical physics should be conducted.10 
Einstein re-imagined his past self in autobiographies and the like with 
the explicit goal of changing the direction of theoretical physics research 
and set new standards and virtues for the discipline.11 Thus Einstein very 
explicitly invoked his role as persona to influence the practice of science. 
Pannekoek’s more tacitly presumed persona had a significant impact on the 
way he believed the universe should be investigated and what its essential 
components were. Both cases illustrate that the persona, as an embodiment 
of epistemic virtues, is indissolubly linked to the daily practice of scholarly 
research. Obviously, this link leaves its marks on the knowledge produced. 
The relation between the virtues of the socialist and astronomer: Anton Pannekoek
Pannekoek began his professional career as astronomer at Leiden University’s 
Observatory, where he had also been educated. In 1906, at the invitation of 
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
12 Schurer, ‘Anton Pannekoek and the Origins’; 
Gerber, Anton Pannekoek and the Socialism, 142-
150.
13 David Baneke, ‘“Hij kan toch moeilijk de sterren 
in de war schoppen.” De afwijzing van Pannekoek 
als adjunct-directeur van de Leidse Sterrewacht 
in 1919’, Gewina. Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis der 
Geneeskunde, Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en 
Techniek 27 (2004) 1-13. Similar reservations almost 
prevailed in the case of Albert Einstein, who 
was initially confused by the Dutch authorities 
with revolutionary art critic Carl Einstein; see 
Jeroen van Dongen, ‘Mistaken Identity and 
Mirror Images: Albert and Carl Einstein, Leiden 
and Berlin, Relativity and Revolution’, Physics in 
Perspective 14 (2012) 126-177 doi 10.1007/s00016-
012-0084-y. 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany (spd), he chose to become a lecturer 
in historical materialism in Germany. He taught at Parteischulen in Berlin 
and Bremen and wrote for several Marxist journals and newspapers until 
the outbreak of World War i in 1914, when he returned to the Netherlands. 
In his teaching and publications Pannekoek defended an idiosyncratic anti-
authoritarian brand of orthodox Marxism, famously inspiring Vladimir 
Lenin, who appointed him as one of the founders of the Amsterdam Bureau of 
the Communist International in 1920. This Bureau was short-lived however, 
as Pannekoek and several others of the Dutch Left clashed with Lenin and Karl 
Radek over the use of Bolshevik tactics in Western Europe. Pannekoek argued 
that these tactics might work in an underdeveloped country such as Russia, 
but that in the industrialised countries of Western Europe, with their well-
established bourgeois classes, the revolution had to come from the workers 
themselves rather than from a small vanguard group.12
After his period as full-time socialist, Pannekoek returned to 
astronomy in 1919. The Dutch government prevented him from becoming 
assistant director of the Leiden Observatory because of his socialist 
convictions, but he was appointed lecturer at the University of Amsterdam (a 
municipal institution) and was given the task of founding an astronomical 
institute there.13 His research in Amsterdam focused on the structure of the 
Milky Way and the astrophysics of stellar atmospheres. For this work he was 
awarded an honorary doctorate by Harvard University in 1936 and the Gold 
Medal of the Royal Astronomical Society in 1951.
Of course Pannekoek never entirely dropped his activities in either 
political theorising or astronomy, even if his professional engagement was in 
the other field. Yet, as indicated, he always tried to keep his two professional 
careers strictly separated. This was reflected particularly in how he presented 
himself. He never identified himself as professional astronomer in his socialist 
writings, even when he wrote about subjects related to science. Conversely, 
he hardly ever mentioned his political preferences to his colleagues in 
science. For example, in 1943 Pannekoek began corresponding with the 
Belgian physicist Léon Rosenfeld and both were members of the Verbond van 
Wetenschappelijke Onderzoekers starting in 1946, but they only discovered their 
shared Marxist convictions as late as 1949, when Rosenfeld developed an 
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14 Anja Skaar Jakobsen, Léon Rosenfeld: Physics, 
Philosophy, and Politics in the Twentieth Century 
(Singapore 2012) especially 264.
15 Anton Pannekoek, Herinneringen (Amsterdam 1982).
16 Pannekoek, Herinneringen, 16-17. Our translation 
from the Dutch original.
17 For a more detailed description of Pannekoek’s 
astronomical research, see Chaokang Tai, ‘Left 
Radicalism and the Milky Way: Connecting 
the Scientific and Socialist Virtues of Anton 
Pannekoek’, Historical Studies in the Natural 
Sciences 47:2 (forthcoming).
18 Robert W. Smith, The Expanding Universe: 
Astronomy’s ‘Great Debate’ 1900-1931 (Cambridge 
1982) 56-59.
interest in Pannekoek’s historical writings.14 Even when Pannekoek wrote 
his biographical memoirs for his family during World War ii, he produced 
two completely separate texts: one about his career in astronomy and another 
about his role in the labour movement.15
Yet despite Pannekoek’s reluctance to reveal any relation between his 
activities, he does hint toward an intellectual connection between science and 
society: 
Interaction existed in so far as that the method of natural science, which I had 
learned thoroughly, helped me discover in Marxism the science of society; 
and that has remained the basis of my work. That is why the theoretical 
foundations of the workers’ struggle were my assigned task, which resulted in 
my contributions to the struggle over theoretical issues.16
The interaction to which Pannekoek alluded was not a guiding, metaphysical 
connection. Instead it was an internal epistemic one, which can be brought to 
light by looking at how he believed knowledge could be attained by either a 
Marxist or a scientific scholar, encoded in what Pannekoek here identified as a 
shared ‘method’. 
Astronomy
In astronomy Pannekoek often questioned theoretical presuppositions 
and emphasised the need for active interpretation and analysis by the 
astronomer.17 He invoked these virtues when assessing galaxy models, for 
example when rejecting the model of the Milky Way proposed by Jacobus 
Kapteyn from Groningen. This model, which Kapteyn worked on in the last 
two decades of his life, was one of the more widely accepted models of the 
galaxy in the early twentieth century.18 It represented the distribution of 
stars as a function of galactic latitude and distance, with the density of stars 
gradually decreasing with increasing distance from the centre of the stellar 
system. 
In 1908 Kapteyn divided the entire night sky in three sections – the 
galactic poles, the galactic equator and the intermediate area between these 
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
Kapteyn’s final model of the galaxy, published in 1922. The half ellipses indicate areas of equal star density. The small 
circle right of the center indicates the location of the Sun in this model, which, according to Kapteyn’s calculations, 
was at 650 parsec from the center.
Jacobus Kapteyn, ’First Attempt at a Theory of the Arrangement and Motion of the Sidereal System’, Astrophysical 
Journal 55 (1922) 302-329, on 304.
two extremes. For each of these three sections he determined the number 
of stars as a function of their apparent magnitude. From that, he computed 
numerically the number of stars as a function of distance. He found that in 
all three sections the number of stars gradually decreased with increasing 
distance from the sun, and that this effect was much larger in the direction 
of the galactic poles than in the direction of the equator. This meant that 
the system was shaped as a flattened ellipsoid.19 In his final system of 1922, 
Kapteyn calculated the ellipsoid to be 18000 parsec20 in diameter with a 
maximum vertical cross section of 2000 parsec (see above). The sun was only 
650 parsec from the system’s centre.21 
Kapteyn’s numerical methods have been praised for their 
inductive nature and for their reliance on observational data rather 
than on sophisticated mathematical analysis like those of many of his 
contemporaries.22 The failure of his model is often attributed to his neglect 
of interstellar absorption, the existence of which was generally accepted by 
the astronomy community only after 1930.23 Kapteyn’s model however, also 
received strong criticism before 1930. Heber D. Curtis for example, admired 
Kapteyn’s methods but said that he could not ‘as most astronomers do, fall 
19 Jacobus C. Kapteyn, On the Number of Stars of 
Determined Magnitude and Determined Galactic 
Latitude (Groningen 1908).
20 ‘Parsec’ is a standard distance unit in astronomy: 
1 parsec is 3,26 lightyears, or 3,09 x 1016 meter.
21 E. Robert Paul, The Milky Way Galaxy and 
Statistical Cosmology, 1890-1924 (Cambridge 1993) 
150-158; Jacobus C. Kapteyn, ‘First Attempt at a 
Theory of the Arrangement and Motion of the 
Sidereal System’, Astrophysical Journal 55 (1922) 
302-328.
22 See, e.g., Adriaan Blaauw, ‘Kapteyn, Jacobus 
Cornelius’, in: Charles Coulston Gillespie (ed.), 
Dictionary of Scientific Biography 7 (New York 
1973) 235-240; Elly Dekker, ‘Jacobus Cornelius 
Kapteyn (1851-1922)’, in: Adriaan Blaauw et al., 
Sterrenkunde bekeken. Sterrenkunde aan de 
Groningse Universiteit vanaf 1614 (Groningen 1983) 
31-42.
23 See, e.g., Pieter C. van der Kruit, Jacobus Cornelius 
Kapteyn: Born Investigator of the Heavens (Cham 
2015) 567-568; Blaauw, ‘Kapteyn’. 
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24 Smith, Expanding Universe, 85.
25 Anton Pannekoek, ‘Onderzoekingen over den 
bouw van den Melkweg’, Verslag van de Gewone 
Vergaderingen der Wis- en Natuurkundige Afdeeling 
der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen 19 
(1910) 243-262.
26 Ibid., 260-262. 
27 On ‘trained judgment’, see Daston and Galison, 
Objectivity. 
down and worship all the results which have come out of this mathematical 
mill’.24 Pannekoek meanwhile, integrated Kapteyn’s numerical methods into 
his own research, but used them to derive results that conflicted profoundly 
with Kapteyn’s model of the galaxy.
Pannekoek’s first statistical research was published in 1910.25 In this 
paper he expressed the concern that Kapteyn had inadvertently presupposed 
an inherent overall symmetry in the distribution of stars. The consequence 
of this presupposition would have been that Kapteyn had thrown together 
large sections of the galaxy into a single function, which allowed no other 
result than the gradually thinning ellipsoid that he had found, and which 
indeed showed the symmetry initially assumed. Pannekoek argued that the 
visual appearance of the Milky Way, with its patchy light structure, completely 
contradicted such a symmetry. His solution was to focus on specific features 
of the Milky Way that stood out visually and determine the star distribution 
function for each of these features individually, while still using Kapteyn’s 
numerical methods. In a first attempt Pannekoek focused on the galactic 
clouds in Aquila and Cygnus and found that, in these directions, the number 
of the faintest stars actually seemed to increase, rather than decrease as would 
be expected from Kapteyn’s ellipsoid model.26 Here we see a contrast between 
Kapteyn’s and Pannekoek’s way of working: where Kapteyn was led by a result 
that came out of his generalising inductive method, Pannekoek believed that 
such a result should be put to the test by comparing it to the visual appearance 
of the galaxy – even though it was subjective. Whether the end result was 
acceptable or not depended on the ‘trained judgement’ of the astronomer. 
This way of looking, of mixing the direct representation of data output with a 
more subjective intervention, was not unique to Pannekoek; in fact, it became 
more prominent through the first half of the twentieth century, accompanied 
by the persona of the skilled expert.27 
Another alternative to Kapteyn’s model, developed by Pannekoek in 
1924, was to take a three dimensional perspective on the star distribution. 
Instead of determining the star density as a function of only two dimensions, 
radial distance and galactic latitude, Pannekoek now also took into account 
galactic longitude. Just as important however, was the fact that his goal was 
not to find the structure of the entire system, like Kapteyn, but rather to 
search for the star clusters that were responsible for the individual features 
of the Milky Way’s appearance. A very different picture of the galactic system 
emerged from these investigations. Pannekoek’s galaxy was much more 
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
This diagram shows the star density of a cross section of a local section of the galactic plane. The diagram shows an 
area of 1750 by 1000 parsec. The numbers next to the clusters indicate how far they are positioned above or below 
the galactic plane.
Anton Pannekoek, Researches on the Structure of the Universe: 1. The Local System deduced from the Durchmusterung 
Catalogues (Amsterdam 1924) 114.
irregular than Kapteyn’s smoothed-out ellipsoid. It was a loose collection 
of clusters and areas with few visible stars, without a clearly defined edge or 
superstructure.28 See above for Pannekoek’s representation of the part of 
the galaxy in the vicinity of the sun. The contrast between this bottom-up 
collection of particularities and Kapteyn’s top-down model is obvious. 
Although Pannekoek did not specify exact dimensions for his Milky 
Way system, nor gave a rough estimate of its size, he clearly did believe it to 
be substantially larger than Kapteyn’s. Specifically, Pannekoek found that 
the clusters that formed the Aquila stream and the Cygnus cloud were at an 
enormous distance from the sun, at 60000 and 40000 parsec respectively, 
which was far beyond the outer limits of Kapteyn’s system.29 These results 
seemed to confirm the much larger galaxy model proposed a year earlier by 
the American astronomer Harlow Shapley upon determining the distances 
to globular star clusters. In this model, the sun was placed close to the edge, 
and not near the centre of our galaxy system. Kapteyn had rejected Shapley’s 
28 Anton Pannekoek, Researches on the Structure of 
the Universe: 1. The Local Star System deduced from 
the Durchmusterung Catalogues (Amsterdam 1924).
29 Anton Pannekoek, ‘The Distance to the Milky 
Way’, Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical 
Society 79 (1919) 500-507, especially 504.
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30 Owen Gingerich, ‘Kapteyn, Shapley, and their 
Universes’, in: Piet C. van der Kruit and Klaas van 
Berkel (eds.), The Legacy of J.C. Kapteyn: Studies 
on Kapteyn and the Development of Modern 
Astronomy (Dordrecht 2000) 191-212, 201.
31 E. Robert Paul, ‘The Death of a Research 
Programme: Kapteyn and the Dutch Astronomical 
Community’, Journal for the History of Astronomy 
12 (1981) 77-94, especially 83; Smith, The Expanding 
Universe. 
32 Daston and Galison, Objectivity.
system, as his results made it difficult to concede that the sun was placed far 
from the galaxy’s centre.30 Most members of the Dutch school of statistical 
astronomy followed him in that assessment, with the exception of Pannekoek, 
who preferred Shapley’s galaxy in what became known as the ‘Great Debate’ 
on the size of universe.31
Crucially, the difference between Kapteyn and Pannekoek is not 
found in the statistical methods they used, or in the observational data that 
was available to them; in both cases Pannekoek borrowed substantially from 
Kapteyn. Instead, differences were due to what they considered to be the 
essential features of the galactic system – whether these were the individual 
star clusters or the overarching system – and at what point in the analysis 
these points of view were allowed to play a role. Such ontological concerns, 
as Daston and Galison have shown, can find their roots in epistemic virtues, 
reflected in the persona of the scientist. In the case of Pannekoek, the ‘ideal’ 
astronomer would have been able to invoke intuitively strong expert 
judgments to actively interpret, free from preconceived ideas, large numbers 
of direct observational data and mould these into meaningful features and 
structures. Longue durée, or ‘mesoscopic’, historiography has shown us that 
the intuitively judging expert came upon the heels of the detached objective 
experimenter.32 This is where our microscopic history connects to the larger 
story: Kapteyn preferred a more hands-off, impersonal method in which 
the procedures had to be set out in advance and followed to the letter, which 
was typical of the late nineteenth century virtue of mechanical objectivity. 
Yet the lack of interpretation during the analysis, so Pannekoek argued, 
allowed unwarranted theoretical presuppositions to become codified into 
the procedures with no way to filter them out at a later point. Thus blindly 
following his scheme had caused Kapteyn to find what he had implicitly 
assumed at the outset. At the same time however, Pannekoek’s emphasis 
on avoiding bias of course is a strong marker of adherence to the objective 
method, while Kapteyn’s apparent penchant for global symmetry reminds 
us of older virtues in which capturing the ‘essence’ of a natural phenomenon 
was considered crucial; as always, different elements of ‘meso’ are mixed in 
at the level of the micro: individuals might harbour several larger epistemic 
developments in their personal methodologies, even though the cases of 
Pannekoek and Kapteyn illustrate the overall development well, just as the 
latter helps us in placing their differences in the contingencies of the period. 
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33 American Institute of Physics, Niels Bohr 
Library & Archives, Bart Bok, interview with 
David DeVorkin, session 1, 15 May 1978, www.
aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/
oralhistories/4518-1 (13 May 2016).
34 Gerber, Anton Pannekoek and the Socialism, 
21-27; Anton Pannekoek, ‘Das Wesen des 
Naturgesetzes’, Erkenntnis 3 (1932) 389-400.
35 Anton Pannekoek, ‘Twee natuurwetenschappers 
in de maatschappelijk-geestelijke strijd’, De 
Nieuwe Tijd 22 (1917) 300-314, 375-392.
Clearly and crucially, different methodologies relate to different 
epistemic virtues, and vice versa. Furthermore, the rejection of a certain 
method could go hand in hand with the rejection of a persona, as illustrated 
by the assessment of Pannekoek and his approach to astronomy by Pieter van 
Rhijn, one of Kapteyn’s students and his eventual successor in Groningen. 
When graduate student Bart Bok submitted his PhD thesis on the η Carinae 
region to Van Rhijn, the latter initially dismissed it because it focused 
only on a single region in the sky, rather than multiple regions distributed 
equally over galactic longitude: ‘it’s the sort of thing that that man 
Pannekoek would do.’33
Marxism
In his Marxist writings, Pannekoek stressed that historical materialism should 
be considered a scientific method rather than a fixed and certain theory for 
the development of society. Indeed, Pannekoek used the terms ‘historical 
materialism’, ‘social science’ and ‘Marxism’ interchangeably. The method of 
Marxism entailed explaining historical occurrences and social developments 
by searching for their material causes. It was similar to natural science, or 
‘mechanical materialism’, in that the goal for both was to provide economy 
of thought by combining vast amounts of information and abstracting this 
information into simple, comprehensible laws.34 It deviated from natural 
science primarily in its subject matter. Where natural science investigates 
the physical world and could reduce the entire world to the deterministic 
movement of particles, Marxism had to take into account social and mental 
factors as well in order to explain the social world.35 
Because Pannekoek considered Marxism to be a science he argued that 
the results it produced were only temporary truths that could be challenged and 
should be re-evaluated as circumstances change. For him, the great contribution 
of Karl Marx was the method of historical materialism, not necessarily 
the results he obtained using this method. His emphasis on following the 
method, rather than the letter of the writings of Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
is exemplified by Pannekoek’s debate with Karl Kautsky over the role of 
parliamentarianism and mass actions in bringing forth the proletarian 
revolution. Towards the end of the debate he charged Kautsky with appealing 
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37 Anton Pannekoek, ‘De filosofie van Kant en het 
Marxisme’, De Nieuwe Tijd 6 (1901) 549-564, 605-
620, 669-688, quoted on 620. 
38 Anton Pannekoek, ‘Dietzgenismus und Marxismus’, 
Bremer Burgerzeitung, 12 November 1910.
39 Anton Pannekoek, ‘The Position and Significance 
of J. Dietzgen’s Philosophical Works’, 
introduction to: Joseph Dietzgen, The Positive 
Outcome of Philosophy, translated by Ernest 
Untermann (Chicago 1906) 7-37, 30.
40 Anton Pannekoek, ‘Dietzgens Werk’, Die Neue 
Zeit 31 (1913) 37-47.
41 Anton Pannekoek, ‘Society and Mind in Marxian 
Philosophy’, Science and Society 4 (1937) 445-453.
simplistically to authority by extensively quoting directly from Marx and 
Engels; he himself, on the other hand, had completely internalised this ‘new 
science’ and applied it with an appropriate suppleness of mind and method.36
Even more influential than Marx for the socialist thought of 
Pannekoek was the work of Joseph Dietzgen, a German autodidact 
philosopher whom Marx and Engels had credited with independently 
discovering the dialectic method and identified as ‘the philosopher of the 
proletariat’.37 There was much debate on the relation between the work of 
Marx and Dietzgen in the early twentieth century. Contrary to other Marxist 
thinkers such as Georgi Plekhanov and Ernest Unterman, Pannekoek did not 
believe that there was a contradiction between Marx and Dietzgen. Instead he 
argued that they were complementary in a crucial way: while Marx provided 
the science of society, Dietzgen provided the theory of the human mind. 
The former explained that consciousness was determined by social factors, 
the latter explained how this happened.38 Pannekoek praised Dietzgen for 
rising above earlier philosophers by providing a testable hypothesis on the 
workings of the mind, rather than claiming to hold the absolute truth about 
the nature of the mind. His work represented ‘a scientific continuation of 
former philosoph(ies), just as astronomy is the continuation of astrology and 
of the Pythagorean fantasies, and chemistry the continuation of alchemy’.39 
According to Pannekoek’s interpretation of Dietzgen, the human brain 
was simply an organ that had evolved in such a way that it was particularly 
suited for a specific task: to mediate the overwhelming stream of information 
received by the senses. The mind ordered this information into neat 
abstract concepts that could easily be comprehended, providing economy 
of thought.40 Crucially, the mind worked instinctively and intuitively; 
its analytical and abstracting abilities could not be avoided. Furthermore, 
the human mind was influenced by any form of information that entered 
the senses, regardless of whether this information had any independent 
existence outside of it. Thus its input was not limited to sounds and sights, 
but also included manmade constructions like economic relations, social 
circumstances and philosophical world views. The Marxist should then 
investigate the social and economic factors that influence the thoughts of man 
on the one hand, and explore how thoughts and actions in turn influence the 
developments of society on the other.41
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42 Gerber, Anton Pannekoek and the Socialism, 95-99.
43 For Pannekoek’s criticism of Bolshevik tactics in 
Western Europe, see: Anton Pannekoek, ‘World 
Revolution and Communist Tactics’, in: D.A. 
Smart, Pannekoek and Gorter’s Marxism (London 
1978). For his criticism of terrorism, see: Anton 
Pannekoek, ‘Friedrich Adler’, De Nieuwe Tijd 21 
(1916), which discusses the assassination of Count 
Karl von Stürgkh by Marxist physicist Friedrich 
Adler.
Pannekoek’s emphasis on Marxism as a scientific method is important. 
First, as said earlier, of course it suggests a direct relation between his 
science and social theorising. Second, it suggests that one has to differentiate 
between Marxists, who conduct research into society and the members of 
the working class who will be responsible for actually changing society. 
According to Pannekoek, the sole responsibility for initiating and leading 
the revolution should lie with the latter group. Once the workers had found 
the right revolutionary spirit, they would organise themselves and through 
spontaneous mass actions slowly weaken the foundation of the existing 
state. When this finally collapsed the working class would create a new, 
truly democratic society that was organised according to the principles and 
methods that they had developed as they lived through the struggle.42
Since the new society had to be developed by the workers themselves, 
the Marxist scholar had to play a part on the side-lines. It was important that 
he did not get too involved in the practical business of the revolution. Instead 
his task was to educate the workers and help them understand why they took 
certain courses of action. He had to analyse the revolution as it happened, 
initiated by workers themselves from ‘bottom up’. At the same time, he should 
offer synthesising insight into whether the revolution was taking the right 
direction, but without any theoretical presuppositions, as an open-minded yet 
trained expert, so to speak.
Crucially, it was not the Marxist’s task to organise the workers either 
by forming trade unions or by creating a socialist party. Trade unions and 
parliamentarianism could provide short-term benefits for the workers, 
but ultimately pacified them and weakened their revolutionary spirit. 
Furthermore, it caused them to rely on pre-existing leadership rather than 
attempting to develop their own ways of organising. Pannekoek’s rejection of 
parliamentary tactics was the main reason he clashed with party leaders such 
as Pieter Jelles Troelstra in the Netherlands and Kautsky in Germany. Nor did 
Pannekoek believe that Marxists could bring about the socialist revolution 
by way of a small elitist vanguard group, like the Bolsheviks had done in 
Russia, or by acts of terrorism. Although these tactics might help ignite the 
revolutionary spirits of the workers and weaken the structure of the existing 
state, ultimately they too, would cause the workers to rely on the leadership of 
a small group of Marxists.43 
Pannekoek’s ideal of the Marxist persona as a detached scholar led him 
to play a passive role in the labour movement. Even in Germany during his most 
active period he only wrote opinion pieces and taught historical materialism. 
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From the 1920s onwards, Pannekoek was no longer a member of any socialist 
organisation and worked full-time as astronomer in Amsterdam. During 
this later period, he focused solely on writing theoretical and philosophical 
articles on the nature of historical materialism. Although his retreat into theory 
was partially the result of his isolation from the working class, the fear of 
influencing the revolutionary spirit of the workers would no doubt also have 
played an important role. Unsurprisingly, his analytic yet expectantly observant 
and academic persona was a vulnerable point for attacks by his opponents. 
He became known as a perpetual critic who lacked political pragmatism, a 
utopian and a star-gazer with his head in the clouds, whose only concern was 
‘poking around with a little stick in the gutter of theory.’44 Pannekoek’s lack of 
pragmatism ultimately led him to be isolated from the working class completely. 
His further theoretical development stalled and he eventually ended up 
dogmatically defending the methodology of orthodox Marxism.45
Conclusion 
In the introduction we have suggested two advantages of focusing on the 
ideal scholarly persona and its associated epistemic virtues. First, it promised 
to bridge the gap between ‘microscopic’ and ‘mesoscopic’ historiography, 
and indeed our investigation of Pannekoek’s astronomy fits the mesoscopic 
history of Daston and Galison very well. The resemblances between their 
description of the rise of trained judgement in the early twentieth century and 
Pannekoek’s emphasis on interpretation, analysis and human judgement are 
striking. These similarities help us to situate the methodological differences 
between Kapteyn and Pannekoek within the broader development in 
epistemic virtues throughout the period. At the same time, we showed some 
of the limitations of the applicability of Daston and Galison’s categories to 
explain the choices of the individual, as neither Pannekoek’s nor Kapteyn’s 
approaches fall exclusively within the prescriptions of either the virtue of 
trained judgement or mechanical objectivity. 
The second advantage was the possibility to cross disciplinary 
boundaries and enable an integrated perspective on the astronomical and 
Marxist personae of Pannekoek. When comparing Pannekoek’s astronomical 
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persona and his Marxist persona, certain connections do become visible. 
For both the main task was to organise and make sense of an overwhelming 
input of direct information, bottom up so to speak, and abstract it into 
comprehensible laws and explanations. In this sense both personae are 
notably required to be active and synthesising observers. At the same time, 
it is essential for both personae to be free from theoretical preconceptions. 
Predetermined ideas, whether they are about the shape of the galaxy or the 
proper way to organise society, clouded the judgement of the astronomer as 
much as the judgement of the Marxist; they would lead him in the direction 
that had already been anticipated from the outset. 
The coherence between these ideals for both of Pannekoek’s disciplines 
becomes even clearer when we turn to his theoretical beliefs about the human 
mind, which entailed essentially the same epistemic positions for both 
scientists and Marxists. Both the astronomer and the Marxist had to make 
use of the inherent powerful advantage of human physiology – the analytical 
ability of the mind. At the same time, Pannekoek was wary of the fact that 
the human mind worked instinctively and involuntarily, which meant that 
its generalising and distinguishing tendencies could not be avoided. What 
mattered then, was to put this quality of the mind to good use while avoiding 
its potentially distorting qualities. The attainment of that epistemic position 
of course, required discipline – discipline to train one’s faculty of judgment 
and discipline when applying it. Pannekoek’s insistence on disciplining the 
mind is reflected in his warnings of allowing preconceived ideas to play a 
role, whether these applied to the shape of the galaxy or the proper way to 
organise workers and initiate the socialist revolutions. Any preconceived idea 
could nestle in the mind of the scholar, cloud his judgement and lead him to 
see what he expected to see from the outset. What in isolation appear to be 
idiosyncratic methodologies can thus be interpreted as natural consequences 
of ways to shape the scientific self, to counteract the weaknesses of the self and 
optimally utilise its epistemic abilities. 
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